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Abstract
Medicare administers a traditional public fee-for-service (FFS) plan while also al-
lowing enrolles to join government-funded private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. We
model how selection and dierential payments|the value of the capitation payments
the rm receives to insure an individual minus the counterfactual cost of his coverage
in FFS|change after the introduction of a comprehensive risk adjustment formula
in 2004. Our model predicts that rm screening eorts along dimensions included in
the model (\extensive-margin" selection) should fall, whereas screening eorts along
dimensions excluded (\intensive-margin" selection) should increase. These endogenous
responses to the risk-adjustment formula can in fact lead dierential payments to in-
crease. Using individual-level administrative data on Medicare enrollees from 1994 to
2006, we show that while MA enrollees are positively selected throughout the sample
period, after risk adjustment extensive-margin selection decreases whereas intensive-
margin selection increases. We nd that dierential payments actually rise after risk-
adjustment, and estimate that they totaled $23 billion in 2006, or about six percent of
total Medicare spending.
We thank Sean Creighton, David Cutler, Zeke Emanuel, Jonathan Gruber, Caroline Hoxby, Robert
Kocher, Jonathan Kolstad, Amanda Kowalski, Alan Krueger, Christina Romer, Karl Scholz, and Jonathan
Skinner and seminar participants at Brown, Columbia, Harvard, Northwestern, RAND, Stanford, Wis-
consin, Yale, and the NBER Health Care meetings for helpful comments and feedback. Contact in-
formation for the authors: Jason.Brown@do.treas.gov, duggan@econ.umd.edu, kuziemko@princeton.edu,
william.woolston@stanford.edu. Views expressed here are solely those of the authors and not of the in-
stitutions with which they are aliated, and all errors are our own1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, the Medicare program has oered beneciaries the choice between a tra-
ditional, government-administered plan as well as government-funded private plans, known
as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, which today cover roughly a quarter of Medicare's 47
million members. Oering individuals a choice between a government-administered option
and a government-funded but privately administered option is a common feature in govern-
ment programs|for example, in the United States, parents can increasingly choose between
traditional public schools and charter schools, and Britain's latest employer pension reform
involves a default government option competing alongside plans oered by private insurance
companies and fund managers.
Critics of traditional public provision often point to its minimal incentives for cost-control.
The traditional Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare program, for example, pays hospitals, physi-
cians and other health care providers on the margin for services rendered to enrollees, and
thus some providers may deliver services with little clinical benet if the payment covers
more than their marginal cost. In contrast, the government pays MA plans a xed capita-
tion payment to cover an enrollee's expected health costs, giving plans an incentive to reduce
the provision of low-value services.
But, as noted by Newhouse (1996) and others, this arrangement also gives plans the
incentive to enroll individuals whose expected costs are lower than their capitation payment,
which does not reduce total Medicare costs but merely transfers government funds to private
plans and \over-priced" enrollees. To address this concern, in 2004 the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that administers the Medicare program,
introduced a comprehensive risk-adjustment formula based on more than seventy disease
categories.1 The formula was used the generate a risk score for each individual, and capita-
tion payments were determined by multiplying the risk score by a county-level cost factor.
The objective of the formula was to reduce dierential payments|the cost to the Medicare
program of nancing an individual's coverage when she is in a private MA plan minus the
counterfactual cost to Medicare had the FFS program covered her directly.
This paper analyzes how introducing risk-adjustment changes selection patterns and dif-
ferential payments. To our knowledge, we present the rst comprehensive economic analysis
of the eort, which directly aects reimbursement for more than 11 million Medicare recip-
1Private Medicare plans have had many ocial names since the 1980s: Medicare HMOs, Medicare-plus-
choice plans, and, most recently, Medicare Advantage plans. Similarly, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services was until 2001 named the Health Care Financing Administration. For simplicity, in the paper we will
always refer to private Medicare plans as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans and the agency that administers
Medicare as CMS, regardless of the time period we are discussing.ients. We analyze risk-adjustment more generally by developing a model of rm screening
eorts, and describe conditions under which risk-adjustment can reduce dierential pay-
ments, as well as conditions under which it can actually increase them. Empirically, we nd
that risk-adjustment as attempted in the Medicare Advantage program falls into the lat-
ter category, with dierential payments rising substantially in the years after its adoption.
More generally, our results show that using additional information to determine prices can
actually aggravate problems associated with asymmetric information, as in Finkelstein and
Einav (2010).
We begin by modeling how risk adjustment inuences the optimal screening eorts of
prot-maximizing MA plans. Before risk adjustment, rms have incentives to enroll the
lowest-cost enrollees along all dimensions observable to them. After risk-adjustment, they re-
duce eorts to screen along dimensions included in the risk-adjustment formula and increase
eorts along dimensions excluded from the formula. Thus, after risk-adjustment the preva-
lence of conditions compensated by the formula will rise among MA enrollees (\extensive-
margin selection" falls), but their actual cost conditional on their risk score falls (\intensive-
margin selection" increases), as they are now more powerfully selected along dimensions
not included in the formula. Thus, both before and after risk-adjustment, MA enrollees are
positively selected with respect to underlying cost, but due to dierent mechanisms.
The success of risk adjustment, however, does not rest on whether selection patterns
change, but whether it reduces dierential payments. We show that under mild assumptions
(which the Medicare risk formula meets) risk-adjustment will narrow the gap between capi-
tation payments and expected FFS costs when selection patterns do not change from their
pre-period patterns. However, we show that in the presence of an increase in intensive se-
lection, there are conditions under which risk-adjustment can increase dierential payments.
Thus, whether risk-adjustment \works" is an empirical question, and an important focus of
the empirical work in the paper.
The empirical work begins, however, by providing support for the selection predictions of
the model, using both individual- and county-level data on Medicare expenditures. First, we
show that risk scores of individuals who select into MA plans increase after risk-adjustment,
consistent with plans devoting less energy to screening along the variables included in the
formula. Second, conditional on the risk score, those switching to MA plans have lower costs
after risk-adjustment, suggesting plans intensify screening eorts along variables excluded
from the formula. Indeed, costs are negatively correlated with the probability an FFS enrollee
selects into MA both before and after risk-adjustment, though the relative importance of
selection along dierent dimensions has changed.
We then focus on the eect of risk-adjustment on dierential payments. We rst show
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ferential payments would have indeed fallen under risk-adjustment. Specically, we nd that
before risk-adjustment, an individual switching from FFS to MA costs the Medicare program
an additional $1,800 relative to the cost had she remained in FFS. However, this dierential
payment is nearly halved when we replace MA enrollees' actual capitation payments with
their capitation payment had the HCC model been used.
Of course, selection patterns did change, and when we instead consider dierential pay-
ments for those who actually switched to MA in the risk-adjustment era, we encounter a
very dierent picture. Dierential payments actually increase after risk-adjustment, even
after adjusting MA payments downward in the post-period to account for temporarily en-
hanced payments given to plans to ease their transition to risk-adjustment.
In our model, MA plans expend resources in order to improve selection along dierent
observable dimensions of health, but we do not specify or micro-found how they do so. One
possible strategy would be to dierentially retain protable enrollees by treating them better
than unprotable ones in ways the government cannot observe or regulate. Throughout our
sample period, we nd that, relative to FFS enrollees, MA enrollees' satisfaction with their
health care is more positively correlated with their self-reported health. This gradient appears
for almost every measure recorded, from enrollees' perceptions regarding their out-of-pocket
costs to their doctors' concern for their well-being. We interpret these results as strongly
suggesting that MA plans dedicate resources to keeping the healthiest patients happiest,
though we believe that future work on how MA plans target and treat enrollees based on
health status and expected prots is warranted.
Given the evidence we present suggesting that risk adjustment \didn't work," a natural
question is how the formula can be improved. We close the paper by discussing the challenges
inherent in improving the current model. First, we show that any recalibration of the model
will likely lead to upwardly biased payments to MA plans. Recall that after risk-adjustment,
enrollees with the lowest costs conditional on their risk score join MA. Because the risk-
adjustment model can only be calibrated with the remaining FFS population (MA plans
do not report cost data to the government, as their doing so would perhaps weaken their
incentives to cost-minimize), that population will now have, conditional on the risk score,
the most expensive cases.
Second, we discuss the costs and benets of simply including more risk categories. On
the one hand, making the formula more detailed might limit intensive selection. On the
other hand, it potentially exacerbates plans' incentives to \intensively code"|CMS's term
for MA plans' tendency to more aggressively document disease conditions included in the
3risk-adjustment formula relative to FFS providers.2
In addition, adjusting the formula for every possible condition means the government
would essentially reimburse MA plans for their marginal costs, exactly the situation the plans
were created to overcome. Finally, adding more categories and thus having fewer individuals
per category could increase estimation error in the government's risk adjustment coecients,
which would give MA plans an incentive to select beneciaries with `over-priced' conditions,
aggravating the problem of dierential payments.
While we focus on Medicare, our results speak to the challenges facing risk-adjustment
more generally. The use of risk-adjustment in health insurance markets is set to increase
substantially: the 2010 Aordable Care Act requires risk adjustment in the individual and
small group health insurance market starting in 2014. Recent work (e.g., (Epple and Romano,
2008)) has even suggested conditioning school voucher payments on students' ability, the
educational analogue to conditioning capitation payments on disease scores. By selecting
individuals with low costs conditional on their risk scores, MA rms' behavior is analogous
to the worker who focuses on the contractable task to the detriment of all others (as in
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 and Baker 1992) or the instructor who \teaches to the test"
at the expense of other educational goals (as in Jacob and Levitt 2003). Our results suggest
that regulators of risk-adjusted markets should be alert to rms responding endogenously to
the formula.
Our results also highlight distributional issues associated with \contracting out" social
insurance programs. The selection and dierential payment patterns suggest not only that
Medicare may have overpaid for the coverage of MA enrollees relative to what they would
have cost in the FFS program, but also that resources may have shifted from relatively
higher-cost enrollees (who are more likely to remain in FFS) to relatively lower-cost en-
rollees (who are more likely to switch to MA). Moreover, consistent with our satisfaction
results, the Kaiser Family Foundation (2010) documents that MA contracts provide many
up-front benets that healthy individuals enjoy (e.g., 57 percent oer free or discounted gym
memberships), but worse cost-sharing than does FFS for serious medical conditions. As such,
compared to the FFS population, benets among MA enrollees are more skewed toward the
healthy. Both of these distributional eects will tend to diminish the role of Medicare in
providing social insurance to smooth the utility consequences of variation in health status.
Because of its sheer size, Medicare Advantage is of interest in its own right. Controlling
Medicare costs is viewed as the key factor in improving the long-term scal position of the
2We do not model intensive coding because for the individuals in our sample we are able to calculate
capitation payments that are independent of MA plans' coding of disease conditions, as we explain in detail
in Section 6. As such, our results tend to underestimate payments to MA plans after 2003.
4US. We estimate that dierential payments to MA plans in 2009 totaled about $40 billion
annually, a not insignicant share of the roughly $500 billion in total Medicare spending
that year. Put dierently, dierential payments amount to over one-third the annual cost of
the coverage expansion provisions in the ACA, which extend health insurance to 30 million
uninsured Americans.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on the MA program and the risk-adjustment formula. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical results on selection,
dierential payments, and satisfaction, respectively. Section 8 discusses the challenges to
improving risk-adjustment and Section 9 oers concluding remarks.
2 Background on Medicare Advantage capitation payments and risk-adjustment
Since establishing MA plans in the 1980s, CMS has generally focused on adjusting payments
along two dimensions of cost: individual attributes and geography. Individual attributes are
used to generate an individual-level risk score. This risk score is then multiplied by a county-
level benchmark, and capitation payments for individual i in year t in county c are thus
equal to capitationpaymentitc = Riskscoreit  Benchmarkct. Below we describe how the
methodology for calculating risk scores has changed, as well as how county-level benchmarks
have evolved.
2.1 Risk-adjustment before 2004
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, county benchmarks were generally set to 95 percent of
county FFS costs (generally calculated based on a moving average over the past eight years),
as it was believed that MA plans should be able to deliver services more eciently than
FFS (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2009). However, by the late 1990s, the strict
link between benchmarks and FFS costs began to fray, as benchmarks were raised beyond
FFS costs in areas of low MA penetration in an eort to expand access to MA plans. By
the end of 2003, benchmarks were roughly 103 percent of average FFS spending (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 2004).
During the 1980s and 1990s, CMS used a \demographic model" to generate individual-
level risk scores, so-called because it included only demographic variables (gender, age, and
disability and Medicaid status) as opposed to disease or health conditions. As mentioned in
the Introduction, MA plans do not report cost or claims data to CMS, so CMS used the
FFS population to determine how each of these demographic factors contributes to average
costs. CMS found that the model explained only one percent of the variation in medical
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prediction, it is unlikely that the model explained any more of the variation among the MA
population.
Because of the low predictive power of the demographic model, there was substantial
scope for MA plans to target enrollees who were healthier|and thus cheaper|than the de-
mographic model would predict. Indeed, previous research has shown that during this period
MA plans were able to attract patients who were far less costly than the FFS population
in general or than predicted by the demographic model. Estimates suggest that individuals
switching from traditional FFS to MA had medical costs between 20 and 37 percent lower
than individuals who remained in FFS.3
Federal policymakers reacted to this evidence by enhancing the risk-adjustment proce-
dure. In 2000, CMS introduced the principal inpatient diagnostic cost group (PIP-DCG)
model. Due to the lack of MA cost data, the model used inpatient diagnoses (thus excluding
outpatient and physician diagnoses) documented on FFS claims data to predict FFS costs
the following year. As MA plans do not submit claims data, applying this model to the MA
population required that MA plans submit \encounter data," which documents an enrollee's
diagnoses. CMS found that the PIP-DCG model could explain 6.2 percent of the variation
in FFS costs.
Between 2000 and 2003, risk scores were calculated as a 90/10 blend of the demographic
and PIP-DCG models: Riskscore = 0:9Demographicscore+0:1PIP-DCG score: Thus,
the introduction of the PIP-DCG model raised the portion of MA cost variation explained
by risk scores from one to 0:9  1 + 0:1  6:2 = 1:5 percent.
2.2 Risk adjustment after 2003
The dierence between county benchmarks and FFS costs continued to grow after 2003. By
2009, benchmarks reached 118 percent of county FFS costs (Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2009).
In 2004, CMS introduced a more comprehensive risk-adjustment regime that is based
on the hierarchical condition categories (HCC) model. Like the PIP-DCG model, the HCC
model uses claims data from the FFS population to calibrate a model that predicts FFS
costs in the following year, though the HCC model accounts not just for inpatient claims,
but physician and outpatient claims as well. The model distills the roughly 15,000 possible
ICD-9 codes providers list on claims into seventy disease categories.4 Initally, the HCC model
3See, for example, Langwell and Hadley, Commission (1997), Mello et al. (2003) and Batata (2004).
4ICD-9 is an abbreviation for International Statistical Classication of Diseases and Related Health Prob-
lems Version IX. CMS provides the le mapping ICD-9 conditions to HCC categories at http://www.cms.
6was blended with the demographic model, with the HCC model accounting for 30, 50 and
75 percent of the total risk score in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. From 2007 onward,
risk scores were based entirely on the HCC model.
CMS found that when FFS data is used to calculate HCC scores, the HCC score explains
eleven percent of FFS costs the following year (Pope et al., 2004). Newhouse et al. (1997) and
Van de ven and Ellis (2000) survey the literature and conclude that the lower bound on the
percent of cost variation plans are able to predict is between 20 and 25 percent, suggesting
there is still potential room for risk-selection even if the model were to perform as well on
the MA population as it does on the FFS population. Moreover, both prospective reports
commissioned by CMS in 2000 (Pope et al., 2000) and more recent work using data from
2004 to 2006 (Frogner et al., 2011) have found that the formula systematically under-predicts
costs for those with above-average costs, and over-predicts costs for those with below-average
costs.
Evaluation and application of the PIP-DCG and HCC models is complicated by the lack
of cost or claims data from MA plans. Whether the model performs as well on the FFS
population as it does on the MA population depends on at least two key assumptions: rst,
that that the coding practices MA plans use in generating encounter data to record the
conditions used in the formula are the same as those used by FFS providers on claims data;
second, that dierences in the MA and FFS populations can be fully accounted for by these
conditions.
CMS has done extensive research related to the rst assumption. They have found that
MA plans exhibit greater \coding intensity" in documenting disease conditions, so that
an MA enrollee's risk score grows substantially faster than an FFS enrollee's risk score
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008).5 As risk scores are based on disease
conditions the previous year, the year after an enrollee switches from FFS to MA, his risk
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/RAdiagnoses.zip. The model coecients and algorithms
can be found at http://www.cms.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/HCCsoftware07.zip.
County benchmarks are published annually in the Medicare Advantage \ratebooks" and ratebooks from
1990 to 2011 are all available at: http://www.cms.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/RSD/list.asp.
5The CMS study focuses the dierence in growth rates between those who stay in FFS at least two
years in a row to those who stay in MA at least two years in a row, to eliminate the eect of compositional
changes. One reason that MA risk scores might grow faster is that the health of MA \stayers" is deteriorating
faster than their FFS counterparts. However, CMS explicitly dismisses this possibility: \As noted above, it
is possible that beneciaries enrolled in MA plans may be getting sicker faster than beneciaries in FFS
and this could be driving faster risk score growth for MA enrollees. Given the care coordination and disease
management activities of MA plans, however, we do not nd it reasonable to assume that MA stayers
underlying health status is getting worse at a faster rate than stayers in FFS. CMS analysis has found that
MA mortality rates during the study period do not explain rising risk scores." Indeed, all the evidence that
we present in later sections point to MA enrollees being more healthy both before and after the HCC model
was implemented in 2004.
7score is based on FFS provider claims data and is thus free of intensive coding. However,
any year after that, risk scores are based on MA plans' coding practices, which are far more
aggressive than those assumed when the model was calibrated.
The HCC model will also oer a upwardly biased estimate of the counterfactual FFS
costs of MA enrollees if these enrollees are positively selected along dimensions not included
in the model. In fact, the introduction of risk-adjustment will incentivize rms to selectively
target individuals who they expect to have low costs conditional on their risk score. The
next section presents a formal model of how rms' screening incentives change upon the
introduction of risk adjustment.
3 Model
In this section, we model the incentives that private insurers have to screen customers based
on underlying cost and how these incentives change under risk-adjustment. To focus on
predicting how rms will react to the introduction of risk adjustment, we take as given the
basic contours of the risk-adjustment formula used by CMS as described in the previous
section.6
3.1 Basic framework and assumptions
3.1.1 Cost of health insurance coverage
Let the expected cost of covering individual i in a given year be given by mi = bi+vi; where bi
is a continuous composite measure of costs based on variables included in the risk-adjustment
formula, and vi is a similar composite measure composed of variables not included in the
formula. As MA contracts have a year-long duration, the model is single-period, and we
thus specify costs over a single year.7 Both v and b are in units of absolute dollars.8 While
E(vjb) = 0 for all b, the variance of v can vary with b, consistent with past work showing
substantial heteroskedasticity in medical costs. We discuss the variance of v in greater detail
when we lay out our assumptions regarding screening costs.
6There is a large literature on risk-adjustment, and Van de ven and Ellis (2000) and Ellis (2008) serve as
excellent reviews. Recently, work has focused on \optimal" risk adjustment, following Glazer and McGuire
(2000) who argue that mere predictive models (such as the HCC model) are fundamentally misguided because
formula coecients need to be chosen for their incentive, not predictive, properties. However, as noted by
Ellis (2008), predictive models are by far the most common risk-adjustment models in use today and thus
determining how rms react to them is an important empirical question.
7We return to the question of dynamics in Section 8 when we discuss recalibrating the risk-adjustment
model over time.
8Note that m is the cost to the insurer|the cost of total medical care plus administrative costs, less the
out-of-pocket costs paid by the individual|not total actual medical costs. As in Glazer and McGuire (2000),
we do not model out-of-pocket costs in order to focus on selection, though return to the issue in Section 7.
8In our baseline model, we assume that costs m are the same whether an individual is
in FFS or MA. Of course, MA plans may be more or less ecient than FFS, and all of the
results that follow hold when MA costs are proportional to FFS costs. However, we focus
on the case where costs are identical: not only is the analysis slightly more simple, but it
also allows us to more easily focus on the dierence between payments to private rms for
insuring person i and the counterfactual cost if the government directly covered her, which
is a key parameter for evaluating the scal impact of private Medicare Advantage plans.9
3.1.2 Capitation payments and risk adjustment
Without risk-adjustment, rms receive a xed payment  p for each individual they enroll. We
model risk-adjustment as replacing  p with a function p(b), p0 > 0, which links the capitation
payment to the value of b. For analytic convenience, we set p00 = 0.
Given that E(vjb) = 0, total expected costs m are given by E(b + vjb) = b and thus the
government would like to ideally set p(b) = b. However, based on the evidence presented in
Section 2, the government is not able to perfectly estimate b. In particular, individuals with
higher (lower) risk scores are under- (over-) compensated. As such, we assume that while the
government's estimate of costs grows with b it grows less than one-for-one, so p0(b) 2 (0;1).
Note that the main results on how selection responds to risk-adjustment and the resulting
eect on dierential payments require only that p0 > 0; assuming p0 < 1 generates additional
empirical predictions.10
We also make risk-adjustment be \payment-neutral," that is, E(p(b)) =  p for the Medi-
care population as a whole. In other words, if the entire population joined a private plan,
the government would pay the same average capitation payment with or without risk ad-
justment.11
Finally, we want to allow for the degree of risk-adjustment to vary, which again mirrors
the actual experience of the phasing-in of risk adjustment between 2004 and 2007. We dene
9Whether the HMO model is actually more ecient than the fee-for-service model even absent selection
eects is an open question. Duggan (2004) nds that when some California counties mandated their Medicaid
recipients to switch from the traditional FFS system to an HMO, costs increased by 17 percent relative to
counties that retained FFS. As, within a county, individuals did not select between FFS or an HMO, selection
issues are unlikely to be driving the result.
10Specically, Proposition 1|that selection along b falls and selection along v rises as a result of risk-
adjustment|and Proposition 4|that the eect of risk-adjustment on dierential payments is ambiguous|
do not depend on p0 < 1. We provide a simple microfoundation for why p0 will be typically less than one
in the Appendix. In particular, we assume that the government observes a mismeasured version of b, which
results in the standard errors-in-variables attenuation bias.
11As we discuss in Section 2, rms were actually given temporary payments to ease the transition into
risk-adjustment, but as a matter of theory, we are more interested in the steady-state results when the
system returns to payment-neutral conditions. Section 6 reports our empirical results with and without
these temporary payments.
9capitation payments as (1   
) p + 
p(bi); where 
 2 [0;1] is the risk-adjusted share of the
capitation payment.
As indicated in the introduction, the key objective of risk adjustment was to reduce the
dierence between a plan's capitation payment for covering an individual and the cost to
the government had it directly covered him via FFS. Having dened how risk-adjustment
aects capitation payments, we can make this concept slightly more precise.
Denition. The \dierential payment" for individual i equals
(1   







. 3.1.3 Screening costs
Though we discuss prot-maximization in greater detail shortly, rm prots are obviously a
function of m = b+v and thus they will have preferences over the average b and v values of
the population they enroll. However, enrolling only specic groups from the entire Medicare
population entails screening costs. Costs may include targeted advertising and recruiting,
writing contracts that specically appeal to one protable group but whose terms make it
unattractive to another ex ante protable group, or even the risk of government sanctions
for violating open-enrollment requirements.
We assume that the per capita screening costs c a rm incurs depends on its enrollees'
mean values of b and v: Since randomly enrolling individuals from the general population
should require minimum screening costs, c( b;  v) is a global minimum, where  b and  v are
population averages. Enrolling individuals further from the mean is costly, so cx < 0 for
x <  x and cx > 0 for x >  x for x 2 fb;vg. We also make these costs everywhere convex.
Finally, we assume that cbv > 0: This assumption implies that for higher values of b, the
incremental cost of reducing v falls. This assumption rules out the possibility that screening
in b and v are complements. Because the variance of medical costs is typically a positive
function of expected costs (see, e.g., Lumley et al. 2002) and v is measured in absolute dollars,
it should be easier to nd, say, a cancer patient with costs $100 below expectation than
someone without a single documented disease condition with costs $100 below expectation.
With screening costs thus dened, we can now specify a rm's prot function. In our
baseline model, we make the simplifying assumption that rms cannot aect the number of
individuals that they enroll, though we return to this assumption later in the section. Firms
instead focus on maximizing the average prot per enrollee, which is a function of b and v.
Thus, rms maximize the following expression:
10E() = (1   
) p + 
p(b)   b   v   c(b;v): (1)
We now use this framework to prove a number of results regarding selection and dier-
ential payments.
3.2 Results
We begin with our central result, which characterizes how rms will react to a change in risk
adjustment. The proof of this and all other results are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. The following two conditions hold when the risk-adjusted share 
 of the
capitation payment increases:
(i) Firms decrease screening eorts along the b margin and thus the average value of b
among their enrollees rises.
(ii) Firms increase screening eorts along the v margin and thus the average value of v
among their enrollees falls.
As risk-adjustment makes capitation payments a positive function of b, rms will spend
less eort nding low-b enrollees and instead focus their eorts on nding low-v enrollees.12
We show as a corollary to Proposition 1 that the eect of increasing risk adjustment on
selection with respect to total costs m = b + v is ambiguous|that is, it is possible that the
increased screening along the v-margin can oset the decreased screening along the b-margin.
The next result demonstrates that increasing risk adjustment does not lead rms to
indiscriminately enroll individuals with high b values.
Proposition 2. For any 
 2 [0;1] and any p(:) such that p0 < 1, rms will enroll only
individuals with b <  b.
This result is the rst to depend on p0 < 1. As we show in the Appendix, if p0 < 1, then
with or without risk-adjustment, individuals with b >  b have capitation payments below
their expected costs, and rms have the incentive to engage in screening to avoid such ex
ante unprotable enrollees.13
12The empirical work will focus on the government's observed risk score|that is, p(b) in the parlance of
the model|as b itself is not observable. But as p0(b) > 0, Proposition (1) (i) implies that p(b) will increase
as well, thus giving us the testable prediction that risk scores as measured by the government increase with
an increase in risk-adjustment.
13Similar to the discussion in footnote 12, this prediction technically applies to b, whereas we can only
observe p(b). In a corollary to the proof, however, we show that b <  b , p(b) < E(p(b)).
11We show as a corollary to Proposition 2 that rms positively select with respect to overall
costs mi = bi + vi both before and after an increase in risk adjustment. Of course, as shown
in Proposition 1, the relative intensity of b versus v screening depends on the degree of
risk-adjustment, but overall positive selection holds for any 
 2 [0;1].
We now turn to examining how dierential payments change with risk-adjustment. We
begin by showing how increasing risk-adjustment aects a rm's dierential payments if
selection is held xed|that is, the rm's b and v (the average bi and vi among the rm's
enrollees) do not change in response to a change in risk-adjustment.
Proposition 3. For 
0 < 
1, moving from 
0 to 
1 will always decrease dierential pay-
ments if b and v are held xed at their equilibrium values under 
0.
This proposition shows that risk adjustment reduces dierential payments if selection
remains unchanged. Therefore, our assumptions regarding the risk-adjustment model p(:) do
not render it completely ineective.
While the results and corollaries so far allow us to derive empirical tests of the model,
they do not have direct public-policy relevance. After all, the key test of risk-adjustment
from the government's perspective is not how it aects selection patterns (Propositions 1
and 2), or how it performs in the articial scenario when rms cannot react (Proposition 3).
Rather, it is whether risk-adjustment reduces the magnitude of dierential payments when
rms can optimally change their screening patterns, a question our nal result examines.
Proposition 4. The eect of increasing 
 on a rm's average dierential payment is am-
biguous.
On the one hand, risk-adjustment reduces dierential payments for enrollees with the
lowest b values|who, by Proposition 2, we know disproportionately join MA plans. On the
other hand, plans react to an increase in risk-adjustment by moving up the b distribution
and down the v distribution, and the proof shows that these two eects can actually more
than fully oset the decreased payments for low-b enrollees.
Note that this result holds despite our having ruled out ineectual risk-adjustment models
(Proposition 3). Recall that the capitation payment p(b) is always a positive function of b,
the health risk as observed by the government. We further require payment-neutrality, so
the government is not merely handing extra money to private plans via risk-adjustment.
But even under these conditions, the endogenous response of rms can thwart the goal of
lowering dierential payments.
123.3 Discussion
Some assumptions or omissions of the model deserve further scrutiny. First, we do not model
rm competition. Competition might lead rms to have to out-bid each other over protable
enrollees. One might thus model screening costs c(b;v) as including this cost and thus as
endogenous to the risk-adjustment regime.14
Second, we have assumed rms can only aect the types, but not number, of people
they enroll. As we show in the Appendix, endogenizing this margin does not change the
results so long as the number of enrollees per rm is large relative to (i) a rm's ability
to enlarge its enrollment by changing b or v; or (ii) the level of per capita prots. At least
in relatively competitive settings|in which rms do not expand beyond some ecient size
as instead excess demand is met by new rm entry and in which prots are minimal|
these assumptions appear plausible. Moreover, empirically, the MA share of the Medicare
population did not immediately change upon introduction of risk-adjustment, supporting
our baseline assumption.
Moreover, this assumption allows us to focus on average cost and dierential payments
per beneciary, which we can observe or construct using our individual- and county-level
data on Medicare recipients, as opposed to rm's total prots, which we cannot. We now
turn to describing our main data sources.
4 Data
Our empirical work relies heavily on individual-level data from the Medicare Current Ben-
eciary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use series from 1994 to 2006 (the most current year
available). The MCBS links CMS administrative data to surveys from a nationally repre-
sentative sample of roughly 11,000 Medicare enrollees each year. It also provides complete
claims data from hospital admissions, physician visits, and all other provider contact for all
FFS enrollees in the sample, totaling about half a million claim-level observations each year.
A mix of cross-sectional and panel data, each year the MCBS follows a subsample of
respondents for up to four years. During our sample period, the data comprise over 55,000
unique individuals and over 140,000 person-year observations. From this sample, we make
only minimal sampling restrictions. First, we do not include the less than 0.25 percent of
enrollees whose Medicare eligibility is based entirely on having end-stage-renal disease, as
14How market power aects risk-selection in the presence of adverse selection has only recently received
much attention. As Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2007) write, \most of the literature on adverse selection
considers extreme cases: either perfect competition or monopoly." Recent attempts to model the eects of
market power generally focus on settings with two rms and two types of consumers (e.g., Olivella and
Vera-Hernandez 2007, Biglaiser and Ma 2003 and Jack 2006).
13dierent risk-adjustment rules applied to them. Furthermore, we exclude the roughly two
percent of individuals who only become eligible for Medicare partway through the year, as
their survey data is often incomplete.
Table 1 reports summary statistics, separately for MA and FFS enrollees. We follow CMS
and classify an individual as an MA enrollee in a given year if he spends the majority of his
Medicare-eligible months in an MA plan, though we show our empirical results are robust
to other specications.15 FFS enrollees are more likely to be disabled, and, conditional on
not being disabled, are roughly a year older. While there are no signicant dierences with
respect to gender and race, MA plans attract a disproportionate share of Hispanics. The
share of MA respondents with annual income above $20,000 (roughly the median of the
sample) is about three percentage points higher than that of FFS respondents.16
The last variable in Table 1 is Total Medicare cost, the total cost to Medicare for individual
i in year t, whether it is covering her directly via FFS or paying an MA plan to cover her.
We calculate this variable by summing the reported capitation payment each month an
individual is in MA and any Part A or B payments the months she is not. Obviously, for
those classied as being in MA, Total Medicare cost is determined entirely or mostly by
capitation payments, and for those in FFS it is determined entirely or mostly by provider
payments.
An important detail to discuss is that an individual's reported capitation payment in
the MCBS is the average capitation payment to an individual's MA plan, not the capitation
payment for the individual herself. As MCBS respondents are sampled so as to be repre-
sentative of the Medicare population, the average Total Medicare cost for MA enrollees in
Table 1 should equal in expectation Total Medicare cost for the average MA enrollee. As the
Table reports, Medicare pays on average $800 more to cover the average MA enrollee than
the average FFS enrollee.17
While the reporting of plan averages instead of individual payments still allows us to look
at how average Total Medicare cost diers between MA and FFS, our empirical objective is
to estimate how an individual's cost changes depending on whether she is in MA or FFS.
Comparing, say, Total Medicare cost the last year an individual is in FFS to the rst year
she is in MA would be a natural way to begin investigating how MA status aects costs;
unfortunately, given how MCBS actually records capitation payments, we would actually be
comparing an individual's last year in FFS with the average costs of all individuals in her
15See Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2009). While enrollees can switch mid-year, well over
90 percent of individuals we classify as being enrolled in MA in a given year spend all twelve months in MA.
16We do not report the average because the survey topcodes above $50,000.
17Unless otherwise stated, all dollars amounts reported in the paper are adjusted to 2007 dollars using the
CPI-U.
14MA plan the following year.
However, we are greatly aided by the fact that HCC scores are based on diagnoses docu-
mented on medical claims in the prior year, and that each year an individual is in FFS, the
MCBS collects all her claims data. As such, we can calculate her HCC score, and thus her
capitation payment, her rst year in MA.18 In analyses where we do these imputations, we
generally limit ourselves to those individuals who were in FFS all twelve months of a baseline
year, so that we can be sure we have their complete claims history that year. Claims data
are not available once an individual is in MA, so we cannot do this imputation in subsequent
years. As we discuss later, given the evidence described in Section 2 on \intensive coding" by
MA plans, limiting our analysis to the change in Medicare costs the rst year an individual
switches to MA likely understates any increase in dierential payments.
Because we can only calculate capitation payments the rst year an individual switches
to MA, much of the empirical focuses on comparing Total Medicare cost the last year an
individual is in FFS to Total Medicare cost the rst year an individual is in MA. Appendix
Table 1 shows the number of observations who are in FFS in year t and MA year t+1 as well
as the number who are in FFS both years (these individuals often serve as a control group),
and how these numbers change across our sample period. We have over 1,500 individuals
who switch from FFS to MA, and over 70,000 who remain in FFS over the course of two
years.
5 Changes in selection after risk adjustment
In this section we test the predictions from the model in Section 3 regarding selection into
MA plans after risk-adjustment. The model oers several testable predictions. First, after
risk adjustment, extensive margin selection should fall, thus leading to an increase in risk
scores, at least for values of risk scores that are protable in expectation. Second, intensive
margin selection should increase; conditional on risk scores, total spending for those switching
to MA relative to those staying in FFS should fall after risk-adjustment. Thus, third, MA
recipients are positively selected with respect to cost both before and after risk-adjustment.
18To calculate the capitation payment, we follow the HCC risk-adjustment formula published on the CMS
website to calculate the risk score and multiply it by the benchmark for the individual's county, also published
on the website (see footnote 4 for the actual links). CMS provided us the actual risk scores of a sample of
MCBS enrollees so we could check how accurately we imputed the risk scores: the correlation between actual
and imputed risk scores is above 0.96.
155.1 Quantifying the selection incentives created by the HCC model
As discussed earlier in Section 4, we focus our analysis on those in FFS for all twelve months
of the baseline year, which includes many who will switch to MA the following year. For each
individual, we calculate two counterfactual capitation payments were they to indeed switch
to MA the following year: the rst based on the demographic formula and the second based
on the HCC formula.
The rst column of Table 2 compares these two capitation payments. The table includes
only those in the pre-risk-adjustment period, before any selection endogenous to the risk
scores would be incentivized. Col. (1) presents the average dierence between the HCC-based
capitation payment and the demographic-based capitation payment, grouped by quintile of
HCC score. Of course, mechanically capitation payments must on average rise under the
HCC formula for those with higher risk scores, and col. (1) merely presents the magnitudes.
For example, the HCC capitation payment would, on average, pay $3,267 less than the
demographic-based capitation payment for the lowest quintile of risk score, but it would pay
$7,419 more for the highest quintile of risk score.
Col. (1) would make it seem as though plans would be incentivized to increase risk scores
over the entire risk score distribution, but col. (2) shows that doing so would not always
be protable. Past work has documented that the HCC formula appears to systematically
underestimate capitation payments for the seriously ill (Pope et al., 2004), and indeed we
nd this pattern in our MCBS sample. For example, individuals in the highest quintile of
risk scores represent on average an expected $4,261 loss to an MA plan. More specically, in
our MCBS sample, those above a risk score of 2.0 (the 85th percentile of the distribution)
would appear to be ex ante unprotable. Increasing risk scores indiscriminately would lead
plans to enroll many beneciaries who are ex ante very unprotable.
5.2 Evidence from individual-level data
5.2.1 Empirical strategy
To test whether rms react to the extensive margin incentives depicted in Table 2, we
estimate the following specication on the sample of individuals who are in FFS all twelve
months of a given year t:
Riskscoreit = MAi;t+1  After2002t + MAi;t1 + t + it; (2)
where i indexes the individual, t the year, MAi;t+1 indicates that the individual will switch
to MA in the following year, After2002 indicates the baseline year is after 2002, and t is a
16vector of year xed eects. Note that while risk-adjustment begins in 2004, those in FFS in
the baseline year of 2003 would be switching into MA the rst year under the HCC model,
and are thus part of the \post-period."
Based on Table 2 and the results from the model, plans should want to increase risk
scores in regions only where it is protable, and thus we estimate equation (2) on two
dierent samples: those with risk-scores below 2.0 and those with risk-scores above 2.0. We
predict that the coecient on the interaction term should be positive for the rst sample,
and close to zero for the second sample.
To test the intensive margin prediction, we estimate the following equation:
Costit = MAit  After2002t + MAit + Scoreit + t + it; (3)
where Costit is the total FFS cost for individual i in year t, Score is the HCC score of
the individual, and all other notation follows that in equation (2). We predict a negative
coecient on the interaction term|conditional on the risk score, MA enrollees should be
relatively cheaper after risk-adjustment.19
5.2.2 Results
The rst three columns of Table 3 report results from estimating (2). The rst two columns
report results when the sample is restricted to beneciaries who in expectation are protable
and unprotable, respectively. As predicted, the risk scores of those joining MA increase after
risk-adjustment, conditional on the risk scores being in the protable region. The dierence
between the risk scores of those joining MA versus those staying in FFS increases by .057
points after risk-adjustment, or about seven percent. For the rest of the sample, the dierence
in risk scores between those joining MA is essentially unchanged after risk-adjustment|and
increase of 0.6 percent with a p-value above 0.9. Col. (3) shows that the positive extensive
margin result holds when instead of the MA dummy we use the share of months on MA.
The next two columns investigate intensive selection, and test the prediction that costs
conditional on risk scores for those switching into MA relative to those staying in FFS should
fall after risk-adjustment. Col. (4) estimates equation (3): the interaction term is negative
and signicant, indicating that, conditional on risk score, MA enrollees are more positively
selected with respect to costs after risk-adjustment. Col. (5) shows the same result with the
share-of-months variables.
19This specication is similar in spirit to the \unused observables" test of Finkelstein and Poterba (2006).
Using the terminology of their framework, Costit in equation (3) is an \ununsed observable" because it is
positively related to future costs to the insurer but, conditional on a beneciary's risk score, is not used to
determine insurance premiums or capitation payments.
17The fact that the main eect of MA in cols. (4) and (5) is close to zero suggests that
dierences in risk scores accounted for essentially all of the cost dierences between those
joining MA and those switching to FFS in the pre-period. As risk scores were designed to
address exactly these dierences and were obviously based on data from the pre-period, the
result is not surprising. However, once risk score adjustment is instituted, MA plans have an
incentive to enroll individuals who have low costs conditional on their risk scores, and the
results in cols. (4) and (5) suggest that enrollment patterns follow exactly that pattern.
A third prediction is that MA enrollees should be positively selected with respect to cost
both before and after risk-adjustment. Col. (6) shows this prediction holds by re-estimating
(3) without including the risk-score control. The model oered no strict prediction on the
sign of the interaction term, and while the point-estimate is negative it is nowhere near
conventional levels of signicance.
5.3 Evidence on selection from county-level data
One limitation of the results in Table 3 is that our data only cover the rst three years of
risk adjustment. We therefore augment this evidence with county-level data from 2000 to
2008.
5.3.1 Data and Empirical strategy
CMS publishes annual county-level data on per capita FFS spending on all beneciaries
65 and older.20 Average county-level FFS expenditures for the elderly during our nine-year
study period are approximately $6,680 and the average change from one year to the next is
$233. We merge these data to annual county-level data on the fraction of Medicare recipients
enrolled in MA plans, and summarize our sources for both sets of data in the Data Appendix.
Average MA enrollment during the same period is approximately 15.9 percent, with this
declining from 17.4 percent to 12.6 percent from 2000 to 2004, and then increasing to 22.0
percent by 2008.
The positive selection with respect to overall costs we saw throughout the period|
documented in col. (6) of Table 3|would suggest that when a county's Medicare population
shifts from FFS to MA its average per capita FFS costs should increase, as more low-cost
enrollees leave the FFS population, driving up the average cost of those remaining. Batata
(2004) formalizes this intuition, using ideas developed by Berndt (1991) and Gruber et al.
(1999) to estimate the dierence between the average per capita cost among those switching
20See Data Appendix for sources. We follow Batata (2004) in focusing on aged beneciaries, who account
for 85 percent of all Medicare recipients.
18between MA and FFS and the average per capita cost of those remaining in FFS. She
demonstrates that, if one assumes the distribution of spending across counties diers only
with respect to the mean, then the estimate for 1 in the following specication yields the
dierence between the \switchers" and average per capita FFS costs, with j and t indexing
county and year respectively:
Per-capitaCost
FFS
jt = 0 + 1ln(FFS shareof countyjt) +  + jt: (4)
There are a number of challenges in applying this estimate to the predictions of the
model, however, which is why we view these results more as secondary support for our
earlier results and less as direct evidence on their own. First, because we only have county-
year-level FFS means, we cannot investigate the specic extensive and intensive selection
patterns documented in Table 3. We thus merely seek to establish, using a dierent data
set and source of variation, that MA enrollees are positively selected with respect to overall
costs and that this positive selection remains after risk-adjustment. As this result is on
face surprising|the objective of the HCC formula was, after all, to eliminate the incentives
for enrolling low-cost individuals|yet can be explained by our model, we want to provide
readers further supporting evidence.
Second, and perhaps most obviously, equation (4) treats changes in MA penetration as
exogenous, whereas in reality endogeneity stories are easy to imagine. Counties with high
FFS cost growth may dierentially attract MA plans, as insurers might believe that these
high costs represent evidence of needless medical spending and thus opportunities for painless
cost-cutting. Of course, the relative health of a county's Medicare recipients also determines
cost, and, especially in the pre-risk-adjustment period, counties with high FFS costs due to
having relatively sick enrollees would not attract MA plans.
We nonetheless nd the county-level analysis useful in strengthening our early results
for three reasons. First, the county-level results shed further light on what those switching
to MA would have cost had they remained in FFS. Recall that the selection results in the
nal column of Table 3 essentially compare two individuals in FFS in year t: one who will
switch to MA in year t + 1 and one who will remain in FFS. While we document that,
relative to the \stayer," the year-t costs of the \switcher" is lower, we cannot with certainty
assume this ordering holds for their t+1 costs, as once an individual switches to MA we no
longer know her actual costs. However, if MA \switchers" tend to have low costs the year
before they switch but high costs the next year, then their switching to MA would actually
remove a high-cost enrollee from the FFS population the following year, and counties with
larger shares of their population switching from FFS to MA would then have lower FFS
19costs the following year. Thus, nding that 1 in equation (4) is negative indicates that
any dierential regression-to-the-mean among MA switchers in t + 1 is not large enough to
outweigh the positive selection in year t we documented using individual-level data in the
previous subsection.
Second, the individual-level analysis cannot pick up potential eciency spillovers from
MA to FFS, as documented in earlier work by Chernew et al. (2008) and the county-level
results help us ascertain the importance of such an omission.21 High rates of MA penetration
in an area may lower FFS costs due to competition or because local providers, incentivized
by MA plans to contain costs, begin to treat their FFS patients in a similar fashion. Such
spillovers decrease the cost of FFS relative to MA, and thus comparisons may, unfairly,
report higher relative MA costs when in fact the lower FFS costs are actually due to MA's
\good inuence." However, a negative estimate of 1 in equation (4)|which includes both
the eect of dierential selection and any eect of eciency spillovers due to local MA
penetration|would indicate that the magnitude of any spillovers is relatively small.
Finally, although we do not have a perfectly satisfying answer to the endogeneity concerns|
no instrument uncorrelated with FFS cost outside of its correlation with MA penetration|
our identication benets from the fact that MA penetration both rose and fell during our
sample period. Certainly changes in penetration may be correlated with time-varying char-
acteristics of a county that inuence average FFS costs. However, to the extent that there
are omitted factors inuencing FFS expenditures dierentially in counties with rapid MA
growth, it is unlikely that these omitted factors would reverse direction when MA enrollment
is declining.
5.3.2 Results
Table 4 report the results from estimating equation (4). The rst column suggests that those
switching from FFS to MA have Medicare costs roughly $1,000 lower than those who remain
in FFS, and when county-year trends are added in the second column the eect dierence
increases by about $150. The second two columns suggest that this section pattern did
not change after risk-adjustment. Whereas in col. (6) of Table 3 we saw a small, statistically
insignicant increase in the positive selection of MA enrollees after 2003, the last two columns
of Table 4 suggest a small statistically insignicant decrease in positive selection post risk-
adjustment. But both tables point to substantial positive selection both before and after
21Nicholas (2009), however, nds that eciency spillovers have not persisted in more recent years. Another
possible reason for these diering results is that Chernew et al. (2008) drops the ten percent of Medicare
recipients who are institutionalized. In our sample of the MCBS, these individuals are roughly three times
as expensive as those in community settings and nearly three times as likely to be in FFS as opposed to MA,
and as such their inclusion or exclusion could have large eects on cost comparisons between MA and FFS.
20risk-adjustment, with no discernible eect of the policy change.
While the coecients of interest in col. (6) of Table 3 are larger than the coecients on
Log(FFSshare) in Table 4, as mentioned earlier, they are not directly comparable because
the former relates to dierences in spending the year before individuals switch to MA and
the latter to the year after.22 Moreover, recall that individuals switching from FFS to MA
identify the earlier result, whereas those switching from FFS to MA and those switching
from MA to FFS identify the county-level results. As we show in Section 7, MA enrollees
in poor health are the most likely to switch to FFS, the opposite pattern we saw in col. (6)
of Table 3, where those with lowest cost are the most likely to switch from FFS to MA. As
such, variation in MA penetration due to switches from FFS to MA should lead to larger
increases in FFS average costs than variation due to switches from MA to FFS, as the former
group is more positively selected, leading to larger magnitudes in Table 3 than in Table 4.
5.4 Discussion
We take the results in Table 3 as conrming the predictions of the model in Section 3.
First, rms have less incentive to engage in extensive-margin selection after risk-adjustment,
and as a result risk scores rise for those switching into MA relative to those remaining
in FFS. Moreover, this increase only occurs in regions of the risk-score distribution that
support positive expected prots, providing further evidence that rms are indeed reacting
to incentives. Second, conditional on the risk score, those switching to MA have lower baseline
FFS spending relative to those staying in FFS after risk-adjustment, consistent with their
being more intensely selected along dimensions excluded from the risk formula. In the MCBS
data, these two eects cancel each other out, leaving the positive selection with respect to
overall baseline costs unchanged after risk-adjustment. We nd similar patterns|of positive
selection along total costs, with no marked change after risk-adjustment|using county-level
data.
Recall that our model shows that if rms increase their intensive margin selection ef-
forts, dierential payments can actually rise after risk-adjustment. While risk-adjustment
will always decrease dierential payments if selection patterns do not change, the impact on
dierential payments when selection patterns do change is an empirical question, which the
next section explores.
22Of course, the dierences in the sample period used Table 3 and Table 4 might explain the dierence,
but, in fact, the coecients in col. (6) of Table 3 are essentially unchanged if we instead estimate it on data
from 2000 to 2006, a period more closely aligned with the 2000-2008 county sample.
216 Did risk adjustment decrease dierential payments to MA plans?
In this section, we focus on how an individual's Total Medicare cost in a given year changes
as he switches from FFS to MA. Recall from Section 4 that Total Medicare cost is equal to
total reimbursements to providers if he is in FFS, total capitation payments to MA plans if
he is in MA, or the total of the two if he spent time in both programs. If risk-adjustment
works perfectly|so that in expectation capitation payments are equal to an individual's
FFS costs|then whether an enrollee switches between FFS and MA should have no eect
on his total Medicare costs.
We make two adjustments to capitation payments after 2003 to isolate the eect of the
introduction of risk-adjustment from other changes occurring around the same time. First,
the growth rate of county benchmarks (the baseline value, which, multiplied by the risk score,
yields capitation payments) rose after 2003, in some counties considerably so. We therefore
calculate capitation payments holding the growth rate of each county's benchmark to its pre-
2004 level. Second, in the years immediately following the introduction of risk-adjustment,
plans received a so-called \budget-neutrality" adjustment (about a ten percent increase in
capitation payments) to ease the transition to risk-adjustment, and we reduce payments to
remove this eect. In both cases, these adjustments increased all capitation payments by a
given percent and did not depend on underlying individual conditions or characteristics. The
adjustments we make obviously decrease the likelihood we would observe an increase in dif-
ferential payments after risk-adjustment.23 Before examining whether dierential payments
fell after the introduction of risk-adjustment in 2004, we explore whether they would have
decreased had selection into MA plans held to its pre-2004 patterns, a key prediction from
Section 3.
6.1 Would risk-adjustment have worked had selection patterns not changed?
Figure 1 overlays the distribution of the change in total Medicare costs for those switch-
ing from FFS to MA between 1994 and 2003 and the distribution of that change from the
same population had the HCC model been in eect. On average during the pre-period, actual
Medicare costs increase by $2,991 for the MA joiners but by only $1,162 for the FFS stay-
ers. The unconditional dierential increase in Medicare costs is therefore $1,828. When we
instead simulate the capitation payments under the HCC model for those switching to MA,
dierential payments shrink by over $800. This $800 decrease remains when we condition for
the large set of control variables listed in the notes to Table 5.
23Also note that our model assumed that the average capitation payment were the entire Medicare popu-
lation to join MA would be the same with or without risk-adjustment, so removing these extra payments to
plans brings the empirical work in line with the theory.
22In short, had selection patterns not changed, we predict that the introduction of the
HCC formula would have substantially reduced dierential payments. Of course, given that
the formula was calibrated on this population, this is a relatively undemanding test of the
risk adjustment model. Moreover, as Section 5 demonstrates, selection patterns changed
substantially after risk-adjustment|rst, MA enrollees' risk scores increased once capitation
payments became a function of risk scores, and, second, conditional on risk scores, pre-period
FFS costs for this group fell. As we showed in Section 3, whether the change in selection
patterns can completely \un-do" the risk-adjustment model is an empirical question, to
which we now turn.
6.2 Did risk-adjustment reduce dierential payments after 2003?
6.2.1 Empirical strategy
As above, we begin with a sample of beneciaries in FFS all twelve months of a given year
t 1. To estimate the counterfactual Medicare cost for an MA joiner in year t had he remained
in FFS, we examine the actual Medicare costs in year t for FFS stayers who are similar along
observable dimensions. The estimating equation is:
Costit = MAit  After2003t + MAit + Xit + t + f(Costi;t 1) + it; (5)
where Costit is total Medicare costs for person i in year t, f(Costi;t 1) is a exible function
of lagged Medicare costs, and all other notation follows that in previous equations. We prefer
this specication to simply regressing Costit as the lagged cost controls in equation (5) can
better account for the fact that medical costs typical exhibit strong regression to the mean,
though we show that results using changes look very similar.24
The coecients  and  estimate the change in total Medicare cost associated with an
individual switching to MA relative to his having stayed in FFS. These estimated eects
are consistent only if MA is uncorrelated with . This condition implies that, conditional on
our control variables, the decision to join MA is not systematically related to time-varying
shocks to an individual's expected cost to the Medicare program. If, for example, individuals
join MA when their health is improving and thus their expected costs are falling,  will be
biased toward zero. In fact, when we return to endogeneity concerns later in this section, we
argue that they generally bias results against nding dierential payments to MA plans.
24The lagged Medicare cost controls include: lagged Medicare costs and twenty quantiles of non-zero Part
A costs and non-zero Part B costs (we found that regression to the mean diered depending on the type
of costs). Note that regressing the change in spending is thus nested in the equation (5)|the two are
equivalent if the coecient on lagged spending is constrained to equal one and the coecients on all other
lagged spending variables are constrained to equal zero.
236.2.2 Results
The rst column of Table 5 shows the results from merely regressing the change in Medicare
spending on the MA indicator|which is allowed to have a dierent eect before and after
risk-adjustment|and year xed eects. Total Medicare costs increase by roughly $1,890
when an individual switches from FFS to MA before risk-adjustment, and by an additional
$1,350 after risk-adjustment.
The second column regresses the level of spending on the exible function of past spend-
ing. The MA main eect is lower than in the rst column, suggesting that some of the
dierential payments in the pre-period may in fact have been dierential regression to the
mean among those switching to MA. However, the coecient on the interaction term barely
changes, and in fact grows slightly in magnitude. The third column adds controls for self-
reported health in the previous year, as well as a large set of demographic and other controls,
listed in the Table notes. These controls are important if, for example, older people tend to
have higher spending growth and post risk-adjustment they are also more likely to join MA
plans. In this case, we want to account for the fact that these older beneciaries would
have likely experienced high cost growth had they remained in FFS. That the coecient
on the interaction term increases by roughly a third suggests, as we hypothesized earlier,
that selection endogeneity works against nding MA dierential payments, at least in the
post-period.
Col. (4) includes measures of current-year self-reported health. We prefer the previous
specication, as health may indeed be endogenous to the care individuals receive in MA ver-
sus FFS. However, in practice, these controls have little apparent eect. Col. (5) is equivalent
to col. (3), but replaces the MA dummy variables with the fraction of total Medicare-eligible
months an individual spent that year in MA. We do not have a strong opinion on whether
the dummy-variable specication in col. (3) is superior to using the more continuous mea-
sure, but take the former as our preferred specication because it gives more conservative
coecient estimates and is perhaps easier to interpret.
Col. (6) limits the sample to the years 1997 to 2006 to investigate whether the coecient is
being largely identied by comparing the post-2003 years to the earlier years in the sample
and thus perhaps not reecting the policy change. The coecient on the interaction falls
slightly, but is still positive and highly signicant.
6.3 Calculating the total value of dierential payments
To fully measure the scal impact of MA enrollment, we use the actual payments to plans in
col. (7) of Table 5, including the budget-neutrality payments and allowing county benchmarks
24to grow at their actual rate. While the coecient on the main MA eect remains unchanged,
the coecient on the interaction term grows substantially.
We use these results to estimate total dierential payments in 2006, when total MA
penetration was 16 percent and total Medicare enrollment was 43 million: (899 + 2462) 
0:16  43 million = $23 billion, or six percent of total Medicare spending on benets in
2006. In 2009, with MA penetration at 23 percent and Medicare enrollment at 46.1 million,
we estimate that total dierential payments would be $36 billion, or eight percent of total
Medicare spending on benets.25
6.4 Discussion
Given that our identication relies on those switching to MA from FFS, a natural question
is whether the cost dierences for this group are representative of the dierences between
the MA and FFS stock. For example, while readers may agree that we have indeed identied
large dierential payments the rst year an individual is in MA, perhaps the cost-containment
measures of MA plans slow cost growth thereafter, so that dierential payments shrink after
the initial year.
The MCBS does not allow us to answer this question, but CMS itself has provided evi-
dence against this hypothesis (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008). Specically,
they have found that the growth rate of risk scores in MA is faster than that in FFS. They
attribute this phenomenon to \intensive coding"|enrollees in MA plans being diagnosed
more thoroughly than their FFS counterparts. Because risk scores in the rst year that a
beneciary is enrolled in MA depend on conditions recorded when he is still enrolled in FFS,
the eect of intensive coding can begin no sooner than an individual's second year in MA.
Given that the growth in risk scores is mechanically related to the growth in Medicare costs
for the MA population, and that risk scores in the FFS population are, in expectation, equal
to Medicare costs by the very construction of the risk score, this nding by CMS suggests
that looking only at the rst year understates the dierence in the stock. After years of
intensive coding on the part of MA plans, the dierence between capitation payments and
counterfactual costs in FFS should fan out further, not contract.
Turning to another potential concern, while we mentioned earlier that endogeneity in
equation (5) likely works against nding the results in Table 5, readers may wish for fur-
25Medicare spending on benets (i.e., excluding administrative costs) totaled $385 billion and $463 billion
in 2006 and 2009 (both in 2007 dollars, to match the coecient units), respectively. See Kaiser Family
Foundation (2007) and Kaiser Family Foundation (2010), which give nominal estimates that we adjust with
the CPI-U. Capitation payments between 2006 and 2009 would have been decreased by the phasing out of
the budget-neutrality transition adjustment, but increased by the continued increase of county benchmarks
during this period, so we suspect dierential payments held roughly steady in the years after our sample
period ends.
25ther evidence. Any bias story working in the opposite direction must argue that while those
switching to MA appear relatively healthy and low-cost the year before they switch, they
systematically have higher medical costs their rst year in MA|perhaps their health dete-
riorates or they put o an expensive medical procedure until joining MA|and thus would
have also been expensive had they remained in FFS. We nd this story unlikely for several
reasons.
First, if those switching from FFS systematically experience a deterioration in health
their rst year in MA, then controlling for current-year health as we do in col. (4) should
have substantially reduced the coecients on the MA interaction and main eect. Second,
individuals are unlikely to postpone expensive procedures until they join an MA plan because
plans tend to have less generous cost-sharing arrangements for serious medical procedures
than does FFS (Kaiser 2010). In fact, we nd that individuals who switch to MA were no less
likely to have an eye exam their last year in FFS, even though vision coverage is generally
more generous in MA.26 Consistent with there being no \Ashenfelter dip" the year before a
switch to MA, when we control for the past two years of medical costs, instead of just one
as in Table 5, the coecients on the MA variables barely change, though become signicant
at only the ten-percent level due to the sample size falling by a half.
Considering the incentives MA plans face, these facts are not surprising. The least prof-
itable enrollees for them in the post-period would be those who have little contact with the
medical system their last year in FFS|and thus no documented HCC conditions and thus
a low capitation payment|but suddenly become expensive their rst year in MA. As we
have shown throughout the last two sections, plans seem able to enroll the most protable
Medicare beneciaries, though both the empirical work and model has not specied exactly
how they do so. The next section seeks to shed light on a possible mechanism.
7 Enrollee satisfaction with their care as a function of health and MA status
The evidence in Section 5 shows that MA plans enrolled lower-cost individuals before and
after risk adjustment. But how do they accomplish this selection, given that they must oer
the same plans at the same rate to all Medicare beneciaries in their geographical area of
operation? We can imagine at least three strategies. First, they may target low-cost and thus
more protable individuals with advertisements or other recruiting eorts. Indeed, Bauho
(2010) nds evidence that highly regulated German health insurance rms respond more
quickly to enrollment requests from respondents residing in low-cost areas of the country,
and MA plans have far greater exibility than do German rms. Second, they can design
26The MCBS asks about eye exams the past year but not other specic examples of medical check-ups.
26plans so that only healthy individuals will join, a possibility that Glazer and McGuire (2000)
investigate theoretically for managed-care rms more generally. Finally, after individuals
sign up for an MA plan, plans can treat healthy enrollees better than sick ones, so as to
dierentially retain the former group. Our data allow us to investigate this third hypothesis,
though we think further work on these and other possible strategies is warranted.
7.1 Data and estimation strategy
The MCBS asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with their overall health care \last
year" as well as specic aspects of it. As the question is asked in the fall, it is dicult to
know whether individuals are answering based on their experience so far in the calendar year
or the previous calendar year as well. As such, we generally sample those who did not switch
(either from FFS to MA or from MA to FFS) the previous year. Thus, unlike the majority of
analysis so far in the paper, identication comes from cross-sectional variation|comparing
individuals in MA with individuals in FFS. Asking someone who, say, just switched from FFS
to MA to rate their health care \last year" would likely shed little light on their experience
so far in MA.
This sampling means we actually have little information on the medical spending of those
in MA. Recall that after someone enters MA, the MCBS|and indeed the Medicare program
itself|does not track their medical claims or costs, and without this information we cannot
compute risk scores. As such, we cannot test whether the specic extensive- and intensive-
margin selection patterns also arise with respect to satisfaction. We would have liked, for
example, to see whether MA plans treat individuals with low costs relative to their risk
scores better after risk-adjustment, but such detail is impossible given data limitations.
Instead, we focus on the fact that both before and after risk-adjustment, MA plans enroll
individuals who are healthier than average. Before risk-adjustment, MA and FFS enrollees in
our regression sample have mean self-reported health (from one, \poor," to ve, \excellent")
of 3.36 and 3.11, respectively. The dierential shrinks slightly, to 3.34 and 3.13, after risk-
adjustment, but the change is not close to being statistically signicant. Given the results in
Section 5 that selection along pre-period spending did not change, this result is not surprising.
One way plans might achieve this selection is to make their sicker enrollees unsatised
with their health care and thus more likely to switch out of their plan (either to FFS or to
a dierent MA plan). We thus estimate the following equation:
Satisfactionit = MAit  Healthit + MAit + Hit + Xi + t + it; (6)
where Satisfaction varies from one (very dissatised) to four (very satised), Health is the
27ve-category self-reported health variable described earlier, H are its corresponding xed
eects, and all other notation follows that used in previous equations. The health xed
eects account for the fact that in both MA and FFS, poor health might cause negative
feelings toward one's health care, and thus the interaction term captures how much more or
less sensitive enrollee satisfaction is to underlying health in MA versus FFS.
7.2 Results
Table 6 displays the results from estimating equation (6). We demean the Health variable in
MAHealth, so that the MA main eect represents the eect of MA enrollment for someone
with mean self-reported health.27 The rst row reports results when overall satisfaction serves
as the dependent variable. The MA main eect is negative|suggesting that someone of
average health reports higher satisfaction in MA than in FFS. Of course, the type of person
who joins MA might simply be harder to please|after all, FFS is the default and they chose
to switch in the rst place. As such, we do not take this coecient to mean that MA plans
in general deliver poorer services.
We instead focus on the interaction term, which is positive and signicant, indicating that
good health predicts satisfaction with MA plans more than it does satisfaction with FFS. In
fact, relative to FFS enrollees, MA enrollees exhibit a more positive gradient of satisfaction
with respect to health in all nine categories surveyed by the MCBS. In ve of the nine
categories (overall, out-of-pocket costs, doctor's concern for your health, questions answered
over the phone, and receiving information about your medical condition) the coecient is
signicant, and a sixth (having medical care provided in the same location) has a p-value of
0.113.
We interpret these results as suggesting that MA plans focus resources on keeping their
healthier enrollees relatively happier than their sicker enrollees. Any cross-sectional bias story
would have to argue that MA plans dierentially attract disgruntled sick people or people
who become especially disgruntled when they are sick. Not only does such a story require
incredibly specic selection patterns, MA plans have no incentive to attract such individuals.
We therefore believe our hypothesis, which is consistent with rms' prot maximization,
oers a more likely explanation of the results in Table 6.
The last row of Table 6 investigates whether sicker MA enrollees \vote with their feet"
and exit at higher rates than do sicker enrollees in FFS. Indeed, the same pattern emerges|
not only are MA enrollees less likely to retain their current coverage status in general, but
27The sample size variation across dierent regressions arises from variation in the number of individuals
who report not having enough experience to make a satisfaction rating as well as some questions not being
asked in the earlier years.
28this dierence is especially pronounced for those in self-reported poor health.
The earlier results suggested that the probability of switching from FFS to MA was in-
creasing in health, whereas this last result indicates that the probability of switching from
MA to FFS is decreasing in health. As noted earlier, the county-level results are identied us-
ing both types of transitions, whereas the selection results in col. (6) of Table 3 are identied
only by the rst type of transition. The exit results are the basis for our earlier predic-
tion that the county-level results would show less positive selection than the individual-level
regressions based on those switching from FFS to MA.28
7.3 Discussion
The results in Table 6 begin to shed light on how MA plans actually risk-select, which our
model treated in a very reduced-form manner. However, given the limitations mentioned
earlier, we feel this topic warrants further work. Bauho (2010) uses an audit design in his
work on German insurance rms, and applying his methods to MA plans would seem to us
an excellent rst step. Risk-selection will likely become an even more important public policy
issue when the entire small group and individual health insurance markets will be subject
to risk adjustment in 2014, as mandated by the Aordable Care Act.
8 Can risk adjustment be improved?
In this section we briey outline the challenges we see in improving risk adjustment, rst
in terms of future re-calibrations of the HCC model, and then with respect to adding more
categories to the formula.
8.1 Recalibrating the model
Given evolution in medical treatments and research, the costs associated with diseases change
over time. As such, the coecients in any risk-adjustment model need to be recalibrated.
However, the combination of intensive selection and the lack of cost data once beneciaries
leave FFS makes recalibration especially dicult in the context of Medicare Advantage.
Recall the model in Section 3, where costs are dened as mi = bi + vi. As we showed
28One might assume that because those exiting MA do not appear particularly healthy relative to the FFS
stock, our selection results are over-estimated and thus our dierential payment results may be over-stated as
well. However, dierential payments are a function not only of selection but also of capitation payments, and
CMS has documented that risk scores grow faster in the MA stock than in the FFS stock due to intensive
coding. So, at the point when they return to FFS, MA enrollees' capitation payments would have grown
faster than their actual costs, and thus dierential payments are in fact under-estimated by considering only
those switching from FFS to MA. See Section 6 for further detail.
29in Proposition 1, risk-adjustment will tend to increase the average value of b in the MA
population, but decrease the average value of v. When the government wants to re-estimate
costs conditional on b, they can only do so on the FFS population. But E(v j b;FFS) >
E(v j b), meaning that the government's estimate of mi = bi + vi will be biased upward for
any value of b.
In fact, recalibration will likely exacerbate mispricing. If certain categories tend to be
over-priced, MA plans have a greater incentive to recruit individuals in that category. As
those individuals will generally be positively selected, their leaving FFS drives up the average
FFS cost in that category. Upon the next recalibration, the category is more mispriced than
before, and MA plans will have ever heightened incentives to recruit individuals with this
condition.
8.2 Adding more categories to the formula
A natural reaction to the intensive-margin results in Table 3 is that the government should
simply add more detail to the formula. The most obvious drawback to doing so is that it
provides rms even more scope to \intensively code." If the only two conditions in a formula
are heart attack and cancer, outside of actual fraud, MA plans cannot document that a
patient has one of these conditions when he in fact does not. But \diabetes with complica-
tions" is far more open to interpretation; CMS reports that, relative to FFS, MA plans tend
to interpret gray areas in a manner that results in higher risk scores. In addition, having
extremely detailed categories would result in, essentially, paying MA plans on the margin
for services performed, undercutting one of the primary rationales for the MA program.
A less obvious drawback is that having a more exible HCC model would mean increasing
the number of estimated coecients for the risk adjustment model. While the sample of
individuals on which CMS can perform its estimation is large, it is not unlimited. When
choosing the complexity of a risk adjustment model, CMS faces a tradeo between adding
more parameters to their model (and explaining more of the variance in costs) and measuring
each coecient precisely. Even if each coecient is unbiased, having mismeasured coecients
can lead to large dierential payments if MA plans are able to estimate the model more
precisely than is CMS and attract patients with the over-priced conditions.29
29To take an extreme example of how a very exible risk adjustment model can increase dierential
payments due to mismeasurement of the model's coecients suppose, for example, that CMS estimated
a fully non-parametric version of the HCC model, where costs were estimated for every combination of
the 70 HCC conditions. Such a model would have 270 parameters, or trillions of times the number of FFS
beneciaries enrolled in a ten-year period. Here, many cells would have only 1 or 2 beneciaries within them,
and the corresponding coecients would be measured with error. Given the skewness of medical costs, some
cells would be wildly over-priced, and going forward, MA plans would have strong incentives to attract
individuals with these specic conditions, leading to large dierential payments.
309 Conclusion
This paper began by modeling the eects of an eort to lower dierential payments to private
Medicare plans by risk-adjusting their capitation payments. We showed that plans respond to
risk-adjustment in two ways: they decrease their screening eorts along dimensions included
in the model (\extensive-margin" selection), while increasing screening eorts along dimen-
sions excluded from the model (\intensive-margin" selection). As the model demonstrates,
these responses can actually thwart the government's objective of decreasing dierential
payments.
We nd support for the extensive- and intensive-margin predictions using both individual-
and county-level data on Medicare expenditures. Moreover, we nd that dierential payments
to MA plans are substantial, and actually grew after risk-adjustment. We estimate that
in 2009 they totaled $36 billion, eight percent of total Medicare expenditures. To put this
number in a slightly dierent context, the Congressional Budget Oce estimates that in 2016
the total cost of the Aordable Care Act's insurance expansion provisions (e.g., the Medicaid
expansion up to 133 percent of the poverty line and the subsidies to low-income individuals
in the state insurance exchanges) will total $114 billion. Thus, the total dierential payments
to MA plans are equivalent to nearly one-third of the total cost of extending insurance to
over 30 million uninsured Americans.30
Of course, the increase in dierential payments is not necessarily waste. It is passed on as
revenue to insurance rms and potentially additional benets to MA enrollees. Town and Liu
(2003) estimate that between 1993 and 2000, nearly $3 of rm prots were generated for every
$1 of consumer surplus the MA program created. How the surplus is split between prots,
administrative costs and consumer benets likely depends on the level of competition in the
local MA market, which we do not analyze and might indeed make for interesting future
work.
We close by returning to the potential distributional consequences of our results. Regard-
less of how the surplus described above is split, the MA program appears to expand the cost
of Medicare while also transferring relative expenditures from the FFS population toward the
nancing of care for the MA population. As those switching into MA have, throughout the
sample period, lower baseline costs and better self-reported health than do those remaining
in FFS, the MA program transfers Medicare expenditures to those who likely have less need
for it.
Moreover, as we show in Section 6, the gradient of satisfaction with one's health care is a
30The CBO estimates the cost to be $132 billion in 2016 dollars, and we use the CBO's forecasts for
ination to deate this estimate to 2007 dollars, the units of the regression estimates.
31more positive function of self-reported health for MA enrollees than FFS enrollees, consistent
with MA treating their healthier (and thus more protable) enrollees better so as to dier-
entially retain them. Indeed, exit rates out of MA plans are dierentially higher among those
in poor health. Therefore, the MA program appears not only to transfer aggregate Medicare
expenditures from the relatively higher-cost FFS population to the relatively lower-cost MA
population, but it seems to eect a similar transfer within the MA population.
These results suggest that governments may wish to take special care in \contracting
out" social insurance. Imperfect pricing|whereby the government overpays a private rm
relative to the cost and quality of in-house production|is, of course, a potential concern
every time governments contract with a private party and has received great attention in
the literature (see, for example, Hart et al. 1997). In the case of, say, paving a road, the
consequences of imperfect pricing would seem limited to whatever amount the government
overpaid. With social insurance programs, however, imperfect pricing can induce private
rms to cream-skim, exacerbating the utility consequences of the underlying inequality the
program was initially intended to mitigate. At least in the case of Medicare, we nd little
evidence that risk-adjustment has solved this problem.
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34Figure 1: Medicare cost increases for enrollees switching from FFS to MA, 1994 to 2003
Mean (median) for MA "joiners" 
−actual: $2991 ($4125)
−simulated: $2169 ($2794)
Mean (median) for FFS "stayers"
−actual: $1163 ($16)
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Table 1: Summary statistics, 1994-2006 Medicare Current Beneciary Survey
FFS MA Dierence: FFS - MA
Disabled 0.13 0.067 0.061**
Age 72.8 74.0 -1.12**
Age, those not disabled 76.2 75.4 0.88**
Female 0.57 0.57 -0.0012
Black 0.092 0.098 -0.0057*
Hispanic 0.018 0.034 -0.015**
Self-reported health 3.12 3.35 -0.23**
Income > 20,000 0.45 0.48 -0.028**
Has a high school degree 0.75 0.74 0.0035
Total cost 7310.1 8044.8 -734.7**
Observations 131,339 19,320
35Table 2: Summarizing changes in incentives after risk-adjustment
HCC payment minus HCC payment minus








Notes: All data taken from the \pre-period" before implementation of risk-adjustment, among the
subsample of individuals who were in the FFS system all twelve months of the previous year. Both columns
use claims data from the previous year to calculate capitation payments under the HCC model for each
individual. The rst column follows the formula of the demographic model to calculate capitation
payments for all individuals. We only show ve quantiles in the interest of space, but HCC payments minus
actual costs becomes negative above the 85th percentile, or roughly a risk score of 1.84.
Table 3: Changes in selection patterns after risk-adjustment
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score Score Score Cost Cost Cost
Will join MA next year -0.118 -0.420 229.4 -2242.2
[0.0172] [0.147] [253.4] [341.0]
Will join MA next year 0.0643 0.0566 -1045.3 -448.2
x After 2002 [0.0309] [0.194] [511.3] [634.1]
Fraction of next year -0.150 171.5
spent in MA [0.0202] [316.5]
Fraction of next year 0.105 -1217.9
in MA x After 2002 [0.0358] [604.0]
HCC score 9903.6 9903.4
[182.5] [182.5]
Mean of dept. var. 0.862 3.181 0.862 6491.9 6491.9 6491.9
Sample E() > 0 E() < 0 E() > 0 All All All
Observations 62,889 10,165 62,889 73,054 73,054 73,054
Notes: All observations are in FFS all twelve months of the given year. Year xed eects included in all
regressions. HCC score is calculated using FFS claims data. Standard errors are clustered by the individual.
36Table 4: Changes in county per-capita FFS spending as a function of MA penetration
Change in per capita FFS spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Log(FFS share of -1022.5 -1191.5 -1060.3 -1267.6
county) [153.1] [181.4] [223.7] [249.5]
 Log(FFS share of 78.36 166.4
county) x After 2003 [264.7] [284.5]
County xed eects No Yes No Yes
Observations 24,878 24,878 24,878 24,878
Notes: Each column summarizes the results from a dierent specication in which the dependent variable
(listed at the top of each column) is a measure of the change in a county's per-capita Medicare
expenditures from one year to the next. Data includes all U.S. counties (with the exception of those in
Alaska and a few others with missing data on Medicare enrollment in one or more years) in each year from
2000 through 2008 (and thus there are eight rst-dierences for each county). All specications include
eight year eects, 3,110 county eects, and are weighted by each county's share of the U.S. Medicare
population in each year. Dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars using the CPI-U and standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
37Table 5: Changes in dierential payments after risk-adjustment
Dependent variable: Total Medicare Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Enrolled in MA 1890.2 937.3 628.0 683.7 899.9 899.2
[335.5] [221.7] [243.0] [258.4] [314.7] [314.8]
Enrolled in MA x After 1354.1 1412.5 1934.0 1928.6 1658.8 2462.2
2003 [757.5] [647.4] [683.0] [702.0] [711.8] [729.9]
Fraction of year in MA 687.1
[287.8]
Fraction of year in MA x 2492.5
After 2003 [806.5]
Dependent var is in... s Levels Levels Levels Levels Levels Levels
Benchmark growth xed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Budget-neutrality removed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Demog. controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health controls No No No Yes No No No
Only 2000-2006 No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 73,054 72,965 72,668 72,404 72,668 60,206 60,206
Notes: All observations are in FFS all twelve months of the previous year. Year xed eects included in all regressions, and county xed eects
included in all regressions after col. (2). All regressions in \levels" include a once-lagged dependent variable, as well as dummy variables
corresponding to 21 bins of lagged Part A and Part B spending (with zero as its own bin and 20 bins corresponding to 20 quantiles of positive
spending). Standard errors are clustered by the individual. \Post-2003 adjustment" refers to reducing MA payments after 2003 in the following
manner: the growth rate in benchmarks is constrained to match that of the pre-period, and the \budget neutrality" adjustment meant to ease the
risk-adjustment process is eliminated. Both of these adjustments make it less likely that the interaction term would have a positive coecient, as one
can see from comparing cols. (5) and (6). \Controls" include the following: xed eects for the ve categories of current self reported health
(excellent, very good, good, fair, poor) and ve categories of self-reported change in health (much better, somewhat better, the same, somewhat
worse, much worse); indicators for gender, race and Hispanic origin; income category xed eects; marital status xed eects; and xed eects for
eligibility status (disabled and old-age, with and without ESRD as a secondary condition).
3
8Table 6: Eect of MA enrollment and health status on enrollee satisfaction
Dependent var: OLS coecient estimates (clustered SEs)
Satisfaction rating (1-4) Obs. Enrolled in MA MA x Health (demeaned)
Overall medical care 75,890 -0.0408 0.0144
(0.00777) (0.00661)
Out-of-pocket costs 75,315 0.0165 0.0222
(0.00909) (0.00745)
Follow-up care 69,770 -0.0191 0.00573
(0.00702) (0.00603)
Doctor's concern for your 74,717 -0.0333 0.0151
health (0.00748) (0.00634)
Information about your medical 75,545 -0.0245 0.0127
condition (0.00703) (0.00593)
Access to specialists 57,193 -0.0497 0.000594
(0.00772) (0.00646)
Questions answered over phone 48,622 -0.0279 0.0195
(0.00926) (0.00771)
Availability of care nights 44,507 -0.00920 0.00726
and weekends (0.00916) (0.00796)
Medicare care provided in same 69,386 0.0208 0.00868
location (0.00695) (0.00574)
Retains coverage type next 82,145 -0.545 0.0787
year (probit coecients) (0.0274) (0.0213)
Notes: Each row represents a regression of the form: satisfactioncategoryi = 1MAi +2MAi Healthi +
Hi+Xi+i, where satisfaction takes values from one to four (\very dissatised," \dissatsifed," "satised,"
\very satised"), MA is a dummy variable for being enrolled in Medicare Advantage, Health is a (demeaned)
linear measure of the ve-category self-reported health variable, H is a vector of xed eect for the ve health
categories, and X is a vector of basic controls: age, state-of-residence, and year xed eects, and indicator
variables for being female, disabled, or on Medicaid. As the Health variable is demeaned, the coecient on
the MA indicator variable represents the eect of being enrolled in MA for an enrollee with average health.
A positive coecient on MAHealth indicates that the relationship between satisfaction and health status
for MA enrollees is greater (\more positive") than that for FFS enrollees.
39Appendix Table 1: Frequency distribution of transitions between FFS and MA, 1994-2006
Baseline year t equals... Total
1994-1996 1997-1999 2000-2002 2003-2005 t=1994-2005
FFS (year t) ! FFS (year t+1) 19,017 18,539 18,305 17,329 73,190
FFS (year t) ! MA (year t+1) 566 399 102 464 1,531
MA (year t) ! FFS (yeart+1) 102 165 457 125 849
MA (year t) ! MA (year t+1) 1,457 3,282 2,805 2,496 10,040
In sample both years 21,142 22,385 21,669 20,414 85,610
Left sample after baseline year 13,883 14,301 14,983 14,284 57,451
Total observations (baseline year) 35,025 36,686 36,652 34,698 143,061
Notes: Unit of observation is a person in a year. Drops all person-year observations in which a person is
eligible for only Part A or Part B for any part of the year of if the person is eligible for Medicare only because
of having ESRD. An individual in a given year is classied as being on MA if she is on MA for more than
half of the months for which she is Medicare eligible in that given year.
40Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. The following two conditions hold when the risk-adjusted share 
 of the
capitation payment increases:
(i) Firms decrease screening eorts along the b margin and thus the average value of b
among their enrollees rises.
(ii) Firms increase screening eorts along the v margin and thus the average value of v
among their enrollees falls.
Proof. We are required to show that @b
@
 < 0 and @v
@
 > 0; where b and v are a rm's
optimal levels of b and v.
The rst-order conditions from maximizing the prot expression in equation (1) with






) = 1 (7)
[v] :  cv(b
;v
) = 1 (8)
Totally dierentiating equation (7) with respect to 
 yields:
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Substituting equation (10) into (9) gives:
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We can now solve for @b
@
















+ by convexity of c(:;:)
(11)
By assumption, p00 = 0, so the entire denominator is positive.
41As @b
@
 > 0 and cbv;cvv > 0, equation (10) gives the result in (ii).
Corollary 1. The eect of increasing 
 on rms' overall insurance costs m is ambiguous.


























While Proposition 1 guarantees @b
@
 is positive, (1  
c12
c22) can be positive or negative.
Proposition 2. For any 
 2 [0;1] and any p(:) such that p0 < 1, rms will enroll only
individuals with b <  b.
Proof. If it sucient to prove this claim holds for 




The rst-order condition for b in equation (7) with 
 = 1 is p0(b)   cb(b;v) = 1:
As p0 < 1, cb(b;v) must be negative. By assumption cb is negative if and only if b <  b
(recall that screening costs grow as a function of distance from the mean), so the rst-order
condition only holds for b below  b:
Corollary 2. For any 
 2 [0;1] and any p(:) such that p0 < 1, rms will enroll individuals
with p(b) < E(p(b)).
Proof. From Proposition 2, rms always choose b <  b. By linearity of p(:), E(p(b)) = p( b),
and since p0 > 0, p(b) < p( b) for all b <  b.
Corollary 3. For any 
 2 [0;1] and any p(:) such that p0 < 1, rms always positively select
with respect to total costs m = b + v.
Proof. From Proposition 2, we know rms always positively select with respect to b so it is
sucient to show that they always positively select with respect to v as well. The rst-order-
condition with respect to v is  cv(b;v) = 1. So, cv must be negative, and cv < 0 i v <  v:
Proposition 3. For 
0 < 
1, moving from 
0 to 
1 will always decrease dierential pay-
ments if b and v are held xed at their equilibrium values under 
0.
Proof. The result is easy to show when p(:) is linear. Recall that p(:) is \payment-neutral,"
so that E(p(b)) =  p. For linear p, E(p(b)) = p( b) =  p, so risk-adjustment does not change
the payment for an individual with b =  b. As p0 > 0, p(b) < p( b) =  p for all b <  b: From
Proposition 2 we know that b <  b in equilibrium, so p(b) <  p for any equilibrium b.
42Proposition 4. The eect of increasing 
 on a rm's average dierential payment is am-
biguous.
Proof. Let (
) denote the dierential payment the risk-adjusted share of the capitation
payment is set to 

























































We showed in the proof of Proposition 3 that p(b) <  p for any equilibrium b; so the
rst term (in brackets) is negative. However, the second term is ambiguous. While 
 and p0
are both by assumption less than one and @b
@
 > 0 by Proposition 1, if
cbv
cvv is suciently large
in magnitude, the expressing can indeed be positive.
Endogenizing rm enrollment size
We now assume that rms maximize total, as opposed to per capita, prots which equal
q(b;v)(b;v;
); where  is average per capita prots as specied in equation (1) and q is
the number of enrollees the rm has.













Note that when the level of q is larger relative to (i) its partial derivatives or (ii) the
level of per capita prots, then equations (15) and (16) reduce to the original rst-order
conditions of b = v = 0:
Why p(:) 2 (0;1)
Here, we explain why we assume that although the government's estimate of costs grows
with b it grows less than one-for-one, or p0(b) 2 (0;1).
43First, assume that the government observes b and c for each individual i and wishes to
create a payment function, p(b) that best predicts ci for each individual i. Since we assumed
that c = b+v and E(vjb) = 0; if the government ran a regression of ci = 0+1bi+1i, the
goverment would nd ^ 1
p
! 1.31 That is, without measurement error, the government would
set p0 (:) = 1:
Now, the government observes only a mismeasured version of b;^ b = b + ", with " inde-
pendent of b and v: This " comes from the fact that the government risk adjusters have only
nite sample size, so it cannot run a totally non-parametric regression of all of the HCC
indicators on costs. By imposing the HCC model, the government ensures that its composite
measure of health (the risk score; ^ b) does not perfectly equal the composite measure of health





predicts ci for each individual i: If the government ran a regression of c = 0 +1^ b+2i; the
government would nd ^ 1
p









= 0 + 1^ b: For our model, we want to know p(b); how the














































no covariance term since " is independent of b
< 1 since the numerator is the same as above, but the denom is larger
44average cap payment for a person with a given b. This equals











0 + 1 (b + ")  f (")d"
= 0 + 1
Z 1
 1
(b + ")  f (")d"
= 0 + 1b +
Z 1
 1




= 0 + 1b
So, p0 (b) = 1 < 1:
45